We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on this kind of coalitions. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the Parliament of Andalusia emerged after the elections of March 22, 2015.
a generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index is characterized. In this paper we take a different approach and generalize the Deegan-Packel and Public Good indices. Moreover, we also provide two characterizations for each index by means of four properties. As we will see, the basic properties of efficiency, null player, and symmetry (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) are easily generalized to our class of games. Then, in order to single out each of the proposed indices we can use either a merging property (Deegan and Packel, 1978; Holler and Packel, 1983) or a monotonicity property (Lorenzo-Freire et al., 2007; Alonso-Meijide et al., 2008) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the key notion of inclusion. This allows us to define monotonic games in partition function form and minimal winning embedded coalitions. In Section 3, we introduce the DP and PG power indices. Then, we provide two characterizations of each of them by means of four properties. Finally, in Section 4 a real example from the political field is used to illustrate the performance of our indices.
Simple games in partition function form
Let N be a finite set of players, then the set of partitions of N is denoted by P(N ). For convenience, we assume that the empty set is an element of every partition, i.e., for every P ∈ P(N ), ∅ ∈ P . An embedded coalition of N is a pair (S, P ) where P ∈ P(N ) and S ∈ P .
We will refer to S as the active coalition in P . The set of embedded coalitions of N is denoted by EC N , i.e. EC N = {(S, P ) : P ∈ P(N ) and S ∈ P }. We may abuse language and say that a player i ∈ N participates in an embedded coalition (S, P ) ∈ EC N if player i belongs to S. We simplify and write S ∪ i and S \ i instead S ∪ {i} and S \ {i}, respectively. Given P ∈ P(N ) and a nonempty coalition S ∈ P , we let P −S ∈ P(N \ S) denote the partition P \ {S}. Lastly, given P ∈ P(N ) and i ∈ N , we denote by P (i) the element of P that contains i, i.e., P (i) ∈ P such that i ∈ P (i).
A game in partition function form is a pair (N, v) , where N is the finite set of players and v is the partition function that assigns to every embedded coalition a real number, i.e., v : EC N → R, with the convention that for every P ∈ P(N ), v(∅, P ) = 0. The real number v(S, P ) is to be understood as the worth of coalition S when the players are organized according to P . The set of games in partition function form with common player set N is denoted by G N and the set of games in partition function form with an arbitrary player set is denoted by G.
It is easy to notice that G N is a vector space over R. Indeed, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) devised a basis of the vector space that generalizes the basis of games in characteristic function that consists of unanimity games. Given (S, P ) ∈ EC N , with S = ∅, let N, e (S,P ) ∈ G be defined for every (T, Q) ∈ EC N by
Then, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) show that N, e (S,P ) : (S, P ) ∈ EC N and S = ∅ constitutes a basis of G N .
In this paper we are concerned with a subclass of G that generalizes simple games in characteristic function form as introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . For doing so, we develop a concept of monotonicity for games in partition function form. The intuition behind monotonic games is that the enlargement of a coalition cannot cause a decrease in its worth.
Therefore, in order to generalize this idea, we use a notion of inclusion for embedded coalitions that will be of key importance for our results and that it is implicitly formulated in Eq. (1).
Definition 2.1. Let N be a finite set and (S, P ), (T, Q) ∈ EC N . We define the inclusion among embedded coalitions as follows:
Note that whenever S = ∅, (S, P ) ⊆ (T, Q) if and only if e (S,P ) (T, Q) = 1. According to the above definition, an embedded coalition (S, P ) is a subset of another embedded coalition (T, Q)
if the coalition S is a subset of T and moreover, the partition {R \ T : R ∈ P } is coarser than Q −T . Notice that both families of coalitions are partitions of N \ T .
We are now in the position to introduce the class of games under study.
Definition 2.2. A game in partition function form (N, v) ∈ G is said to be a simple game in partition function form if it satisfies the three conditions below:
An embedded coalition, (S, P ) ∈ EC N , is said to be winning if v(S, P ) = 1 and losing otherwise.
A game in partition function form satisfying condition iii) is said to be monotonic. The set of simple games in partition function form with common player set N is denoted by SG N and the set of simple games in partition function form with an arbitrary player set is denoted by SG.
Simple games in partition function form can model parliamentary procedures based on the plurality rule. First, each embedded coalition is either winning or losing. Second, the grand coalition is always winning. 2 Third, suppose that (S, P ) ∈ EC N is a winning embedded coalition, then if coalition S grows or the remaining agents are more divided the resulting embedded coalition remains to be winning.
It is straightforward to check that the games that form the basis of de Clippel and Serrano (2008), see Eq.
(1), are instances of simple games in partition function form as defined above.
That is, if N is a finite set of players, then for every (S, P ) ∈ EC N , N, e (S,P ) ∈ SG.
The monotonicity property considered above allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. Let (N, v) ∈ SG. A winning embedded coalition (S, P ) ∈ EC N is said to be minimal if every proper subset of it is a losing embedded coalition, i.e., if (T, Q)
The set of all minimal winning embedded coalitions of a simple game in partition function form is denoted by M(v) and the subset of minimal winning embedded coalitions that contain a given player i ∈ N is denoted by
A player i ∈ N is said to be a null player in (N, v) ∈ SG if she does not participate in any minimal winning embedded coalition, i.e., M i (v) = ∅. Similarly, two players i, j ∈ N are said to be symmetric in (N, v) ∈ SG if exchanging the two players does not change the worth of an embedded coalition, i.e., if for every (S, P ) ∈ EC N such that S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
where
It is easy to notice, that as a consequence of the monotonicity property, a simple game in partition function form is completely determined by the set of minimal winning embedded coalitions of the game. In a sense, all the relevant information of a simple game in partition function form is condensed in the set of minimal winning embedded coalitions. We state this fact formally in the two propositions below.
Proposition 2.1. Every simple game in partition function form can be obtained as the maximum of games in a subset of N, e (S,P ) : (S, P ) ∈ EC N and S = ∅ . Indeed, for every (N, v) ∈ SG and every (T, Q) ∈ EC N it holds that
active coalition to be of a minimal size and on the other hand, it demands the inactive coalitions to be of maximal size. Second, every minimal winning embedded coalition emerges with the same probability. Third, the agents participating in a minimal winning embedded coalition share the power equally.
Definition 3.2. PG is the power index defined for every (N, v) ∈ SG and i ∈ N by
Similar to DP, the definition of PG above considers that in order to measure the power of an agent in a simple game in partition function form only minimal winning embedded coalitions should be taken into consideration. The main difference lies in the fact that PG is not sensitive to the sizes of minimal winning embedded coalitions. Instead, it suggests that the power of an agent stems from the number of minimal winning embedded coalitions in which she participates.
Next, we describe a number of properties that a power index may satisfy. The first three are reformulations of standard axioms in cooperative game theory.
npp A power index f satisfies the null player property if for every (N, v) ∈ SG and every null
sym A power index f satisfies symmetry if for every (N, v) ∈ SG and every pair i, j ∈ N of symmetric players in (N, v),
Little discussion is needed on the three properties above. Indeed, they are trivial adaptations of properties that any sensible power index should satisfy (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) .
In order to single out the power indices DP or PG we need an additional property. As we will see, the two merging properties introduced in Deegan and Packel (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983) can be easily adapted to our setting of games in partition function form.
The common feature of the aforementioned properties is that they require the power in the maximum of certain pairs of simple games to be weighted averages of the powers in the two games. Obviously, the two properties only differ on the weights used in the average. Before we can present these adaptations we have to introduce some additional concepts. For every (N, v) , (N, w) ∈ SG, we define the maximum game, (N, v ∨ w) ∈ SG, for every (S, P ) ∈ EC N by (v ∨ w)(S, P ) = max {v(S, P ), w(S, P )}. It is easy to notice that a minimal winning embedded coalition of the maximum game is a minimal winning embedded coalition in one of the two original games. However, there are cases in which minimal winning embedded coalitions in the original games are not so in the maximum game. These situations are ruled out in the following concept. Two simple games in partition function form (N, v), (N, w) ∈ SG are said to be mergeable if
It is straightforward to check that the minimal winning embedded coalitions in the maximum of two mergeable games is precisely the union of the minimal winning embedded coalitions in the original simple games in partition function form. The two properties below describe the distribution of power in the maximum of two mergeable simple games in partition function form.
DP-mer A power index f satisfies DP-mergeability if for every pair of mergeable simple games in partition function form and every i ∈ N , (N, v), (N, w) ∈ SG,
PG-mer A power index f satisfies PG-mergeability if for every pair of mergeable simple games in partition function form (N, v), (N, w) ∈ SG and every i ∈ N ,
Both DP-mer and PG-mer state that the power in the maximum of two mergeable simple games in partition function form is a weighted average of the power in each of the original games. According to DP-mer the weights are given by the ratio of the number of minimal winning embedded coalitions in the original game and in the maximum game. Meanwhile, PGmer uses weights given by the ratio of the sum of cardinalities of minimal winning embedded coalitions in which every agent participates both in the original game and in the maximum game.
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|S| . Second, suppose that f is uniquely determined for every (N, v) ∈ SG with |M(v)| < r. Let (N, v) ∈ SG with M(v) = S 1 , P 1 , . . . , (S r , P r ) .
Next, by Proposition 2.1 we have that for every (T, Q) ∈ EC
where w(T, Q) = max e (S k ,P k ) (T, Q) : k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} . Since S 1 , P 1 , . . . , (S r , P r ) is the set of all minimal winning embedded coalitions of (N, v) then, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, S k , P k (S r , P r ) and (S r , P r ) S k , P k . Then, (N, w) and N, e (Sr,P r ) are mergeable games and by DP-mer for every i ∈ N ,
with |M(v)| < r, for some r > 1. Let (N, v) ∈ SG such that M(v) = S 1 , P 1 , . . . , (S r , P r ) with r > 1 and R = S 1 ∩ · · · ∩ S r . Note that R = N because r > 1. Then, consider i ∈ R.
If i ∈ S l for every l = 1, . . . , r, then i is a null player and f i (N, v) = 0 by npp. If there is some l ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that i ∈ S l \ R then, define (N, w) ∈ SG with M(w) = M i (v). Since the embedded coalitions in M i (v) are minimal winning in (N, v) , there is no inclusion relation among them. Then, by Proposition 2.2, (N, w) ∈ SG is unique and well defined. Next, taking into account that M i (w) = M i (v) and applying the DP-mon property twice,
Note that since i / ∈ R, |M(w)| < |M(v)|. Then, the right hand side of Eq. (3) is unique by induction and so, f i (N, v) is uniquely determined. Finally, let i ∈ R. By eff, j∈R f j (N, v) is uniquely determined. Suppose that |R| > 1, otherwise the proof concludes. Notice that every pair of players j, k ∈ R are symmetric in (N, v) ∈ SG. Then by sym, f i (N, v) is also unique.
In a similar way we can characterize the PG power index using the PG-mon property.
Theorem 3.4. PG is the only power index satisfying eff, npp, sym, and PG-mon.
Proof. On the one hand, we already now that PG satisfies eff, npp, and sym. By definition, for every (N, v) ∈ SG and and i ∈ N , PG i (N, v) j∈N |M j (v)| = |M i (v)| and it follows that PG satisfies PG-mon. On the other hand, for the uniqueness we follow the same lines as in Theorem 3.3. The only difference is in the last step where instead of DP-mon we now apply PG-mon and instead of Eq. (3) we obtain
for i / ∈ R. Thus, the uniqueness follows by induction. The reasoning for i ∈ R is analogous.
A political example
In this section, we illustrate the performance of the new power indices and compare the dis- In the first place, we consider the most common decision rule in the Parliament which is the simple majority. More precisely, let N = {P S, P P, P O, CI, IU } and w = (w P S , w P P , w P O , w CI , w IU ) = (47, 33, 15, 9, 5) . Then for every S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if and only if i∈S w i ≥ 55. In this simple game in characteristic function there are only 4 minimal winning coalitions, namely {P S, P P }, {P S, P O}, {P S, CI}, and {P P, P O, CI}. From an inspection of the minimal winning coalitions we conclude that IU is a null player and P P , P O, and CI are symmetric players.
In the second place, we consider a decision procedure based on the plurality rule. To be precise, we define the simple game in partition function form, (N, v) ∈ SG, as follows:
i) If there is one coalition S supported by more members than any other coalition in a given coalition structure P , i.e., if i∈S w i > i∈T w i , for every T ∈ P −S . Then, v(S, P ) = 1 and v(T, P ) = 0 for every T ∈ P −S .
ii) In case there are draws among the coalitions with maximum overall weight we use a tiebreaking rule to determine the winning coalition. For the case of a Parliament, we propose to count the number of votes in the elections. In the example under consideration there is one coalition structure, namely P = {{P S}, {P P, CI, IU }, {P O}} in which the coalitions embedded coalitions (sixth and ninth rows of Table 1 ). Another difference that can be observed from the list above is that P P , P O, and CI are not symmetric players anymore.
In Table 2 we depict the Deegan-Packel and Public Good power indices of the parties in the Parliament of Andalusia both when we consider the simple game in characteristic function form (majority rule) and in partition function form (plurality rule).
Charac. Several comments are in order. First, when we move from the simple majority to the plurality rule, the strongest party becomes more powerful. This can be explained by the fact that with the majority rule P S needs 8 more seats to form a winning coalition. However, when we consider the plurality rule depending on how the rest of the players are organized, P S alone can form a winning coalition (see Table 1 ). Second, the three parties that were symmetric with the simple majority rule decrease their power. This can also be explained by the fact that it is easier to form a winning coalition with the plurality rule than with the majority rule. Therefore, it is more difficult for intermediate parties to be critical, i.e., it is more difficult for them to participate in a minimal winning embedded coalition. Third, as we have already mentioned IU is not a null player when we consider the plurality rule. This party is too small to participate in a minimal winning coalition with the majority rule, but it participates in two minimal winning embedded coalitions. Forth, according to the PG index, P P , P O, and CI have the same power. This is surprising given the difference between their seats and because they are not symmetric players.
However, it is easy to see from Table 1 that they do participate in the same number of minimal winning embedded coalitions.
Finally, and probably the most surprising observation is that according to the DP index, P O has more power than P P even though it has less seats. In Table 1 , we can see that the only difference between P P and P O is in lines 5 and 9. Since the DP index shares the power equally among the members of the active coalition, P O is being allocated more power than P P , even though it has less seats. That is, the DP index does not satisfy local monotonicity. It is easy to find an example to show that the PG index does not satisfy it either. Local monotonicity requires that if player i has less seats than player j, then i cannot have more power than j. Felsenthal and Machover (1995) propose (in addition to three postulates) local monotonicity as major desiderata for a measure of voting power. Even though the DP and PG power indices do not satisfy local monotonicity, they are interesting measures in situations where minimal winning coalitions play an important role. For instance, Holler and Napel (2005) argue that taking only minimal winning coalitions to measure power is adequate because any other winning coalition contains redundant members.
Conclusions
Games in partition function form capture the fact that the value of a group of agents may depend on how the others organize themselves. Here, any kind of unordered partition of the agents is possible in contrast with other models. For instance, the partition is fixed in the a priori unions model (Owen, 1977; Hart and Kurz, 1983) and in games with r alternatives there is an order in the elements of the partition (see for instance, Bolger, 1993; Amer et al., 1998; Carreras and Magaña, 2008, among others) .
In the literature, as we mention in the introduction, several extensions of simple games have been proposed for games in partition function form. Different approaches arise from different ways of extending the binary relation of inclusion to this setting. We introduce a class of simple games in the context of games in partition function form by defining a property of monotonicity related to the one in Carreras and Magaña (2008) The extension of the Banzhaf power index is a topic for future research.
Another interesting issue that remains open is the development of procedures to ease the computation of these indices. Notice that of the number of embedded coalitions grows faster than the number of regular coalitions as the number of agents increases. In relation to these, the indices built considering only minimal winning embedded coalitions can be computed in an easier way once they are identified. Then, it can be interesting to find efficient procedures to obtain this type of embedded coalitions. 
